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Housing mortgage finance in India is constrained by the maximum loan-to-
cost ratio and installment income ratio conditions imposed by housing
finance companies.  The typical reason for this behaviour is that the market
for the sharing of risk in mortgage lending is not yet fully developed.
Mortgage insurance plays an important role in developing this market. The
objective of this paper is to present a case for mortgage insurance market in
India.  This paper develops a mortgage premium structure framework in
which mortgage insurers charge an insurance premium that equates losses
to revenue.
This paper also models mortgage termination due to prepayment and
defaults.  We contend that the termination of mortgage in housing is not as
`ruthless’ as OPM theory would suggest, primarily because households are
not financiers in the `stricter sense’.  We have used the Cox proportional
hazard model to analyze prepayment and default of mortgage behaviour in
India.  The results indicate that financial concerns (like the option price, loan
to value ratio, and monthly principal and interest to income ratio) are
important determinants besides household characteristics.  The cumulative
prepayment or default probabilities from these models are used in the
estimation of the insurance premium structure.
Keywords
Default, Home mortgages, India, insurance, mortgage prepayment,
proportional hazard58 Tiwari
Introduction
The home mortgage market is growing rapidly in volume and importance.
The outstanding volume of residential mortgage in India is currently over 200
billion rupees and the volume has more than tripled during the last 15 years.
The last decade has seen the emergence of many new housing finance
companies, and an increasing participation of banks in lending for housing
finance.  Traditionally, the housing finance business in India has been limited
to primary markets.  The nature of housing companies has been like a typical
savings and loan corporation.  The linkage with the secondary market has
been very weak.  Housing finance companies have to raise resources from the
primary markets through various deposit schemes and lend to individual
borrowers.  These companies bear the risk associated with the housing
mortgage.  Unlike housing finance markets in the USA or the UK, the role of
secondary markets has been meager in India.  Only recently, National
Housing Bank (NHB) permitted mortgage-backed securities with the role of
NHB as the ‘special purpose vehicle’.  The first pool of mortgages
securitized by NHB was fully subscribed by financial institutions.  One of the
consequences of weak linkage with secondary market has been that the risk
related to housing finance is solely borne by the housing finance institutions.
This has restricted the availability of finance.  The other implication of this is
seen in the low loan-to-cost ratios of residential properties.  The average
loan-to-cost ratio in India is around 55%.  In the USA, the loan-to-cost ratio
is around 95%, and in Japan it is around 80%.  A low loan-to-cost ratio
implies that households have to amass a substantial amount of their own
equity before deciding to buy their own houses.  High equity requirement for
housing has been a major constraint in home ownership.
In the absence of a secondary market, institutions and banks making housing
loans bear various lending risks.  These lending risks are (I) macro-economic
risk – due to changes in interest rates, which in turn are due to changes in
macroeconomic conditions, and (ii) liquidity risk – due to prepayment and
default of loans.  Housing finance institutions design instruments with an
intention to offset these risks.  The typical way is a penalty imposed for
prepayments and high interest rates for lending to take into account macro-
economic risk.  The high interest payments by households restrict their ability
to borrow any further because the monthly payments towards their housing
loans are restricted by their income.  Housing finance institutions set the limit
of monthly payments to about 30% of the monthly income of the borrower.
Wealth and income constraints restrict households from achieving the desired
standard of housing.  In more developed housing finance markets like the
USA or Hong Kong, mortgage insurance plays an active role where income
and wealth are binding for households’ access to housing finance.  HousingHome Mortgage Risk: A Case for Insurance in India 59
mortgage insurance does not exist in India.  In fact, the insurance market is in
its infant stage in India, and has assumed great importance recently after the
Government allowed private insurers to operate in the Indian insurance
market.  This paper is written with two purposes: (I) to empirically estimate
risks associated with housing mortgages, and (ii) to design a framework for
mortgage insurance in India.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of the role of residential mortgage insurance in housing finance and home
ownership.  Section 3 reviews the literature in measuring the risk associated
with the residential mortgages.  Section 4 presents the results of the
estimation of risk for residential mortgage market in India.  In Section 5, a
framework for residential mortgage insurance is presented.  Section 6
concludes the discussion.
The Role of Residential Mortgage Insurance
In developed economies, mortgage insurance has become an important
instrument to cover some of the risks incurred by housing finance institutions
or investors in mortgage-based securities, and also to assist borrowers in
mobilizing higher amounts of housing loans than would have been possible
otherwise, due to their wealth and income constraints.
For wealthier households, choice of loan-to-cost ratio depends on a
household’s portfolio diversification desires and its aversion to risk, as well
as the after-tax cost of mortgage financing relative to both the cost of other
debt financing and after-tax returns on financial assets (Jones, 1993).  For
less wealthy households facing binding mortgage qualification constraints,
the choice is more straightforward: what loan-to-cost ratio maximizes their
wealth is the value of the house they can purchase.
Figure 1
1 illustrates the maximum attainable housing value when wealth and
income constraints are binding separately, simultaneously, or not at all
binding.  The right vertical axis is the house value and the left axis is wealth.
The horizontal axis is the loan to cost ratio, ranging from 0 to 0.95.  The two
upward sloping lines indicate the maximum house value possible given the
initial wealth of  L W (low) or  H W (high).  These curves can be derived by
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* 30 . 0  for different LTV values.  Increasing the LTV
makes a given wealth amount go down, but it also reduces the buying power
at a given income level because income constraint becomes binding.
Consider a household with wealth  L W  and income Y.  Its possibility set is the
slashed area.  If the optimal unconstrained house value is  *
L V (indicated on the
right vertical axis), the household can achieve this value anywhere on the line
segment AB.  That is, with an LTV between 0.8 (this LTV is possible even
without buying mortgage insurance) and 0.95 (if this LTV is possible by
buying mortgage insurance).  On the other hand, an optimal unconstrained
house value of  *
H V is unattainable.  The best a low wealth household can do is
to select a 95% LTV and buy mortgage insurance and reach the point C.
Now let us consider a household with wealth  L H W W > .  With a higher wealth
curve, the possibility set expands to include the dotted area.  An LTV of 0.4
to 0.95 allows the household to reach  *
L V .  At the point of intersection of the
wealth curve and income curve, the two constraints are equally non-binding.
To achieve a higher level of LTV, households buy mortgage insurance, which
protects lenders against claims.  By its nature, mortgage insurance is different
from typical insurance in the following ways:
First, the casualty insurance covers a single period, so the performance of a
particular policy can be used in determining the premium to be charged in the
subsequent periods.  Mortgage insurance, on the other hand, covers multiple
periods with premiums defined at the origination date.
Second, in contrast to life insurance, mortgage insurance has a definite
termination date, and the claim decreases rather than increases over time.
                                                
2 A house is financed with debt and equity (E).  Thus, V=LTV*V+E.  The maximum
house purchase is one in which all available wealth is invested in the house, i.e.
E=W.
3 The housing cost underwriting constraint is  Y V LTV * 3 . 0 * = φ , where φ includes
the principal and interest payment per annum and Y is the annual initial income of









Third, both prepayment and default of housing loans are highly correlated to
macro-economic variables like interest rates, property price movements, and
household income.  Therefore, the risk involved is a systematic risk.
Given these unique features, premium structure and the calculation of
mortgage premiums would be very different from a typical insurance policy.
The literature on the pricing of mortgage insurance is scanty.
Figure 1:  Mortgage Qualification Constraints and the Optimal Loan to
Cost Ratio
Loan-to-cost Ratio
This paper uses the framework for calculation of feasible insurance premium
structure proposed by Kuo and Yang (1997).  A feasible premium structure is
defined as one such that the present value of expected loss for the insurer is
equal to that of the expected premium revenues.  For each period, a borrower
determines whether to default, prepay, or continue the loan by making
payments.  The conditional probability of default and prepayment rates at
time t are given by  t d and  t p .  The conditional probability of continuation of
payment of loan bill is  t t t p d C − − = 1 .
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For the insurer, the present value of accumulated loss from present to time t,
denoted by  t EAL is given by:
t t EL EL EL EAL + + + = ... 2 1                                                                             (1)
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where  t B is the unpaid balance at time t,  R L is the ratio of the loss-to-unpaid
balance at time t, and r is the present value factor dependent on the discount
rate used for calculating the present value of loss and revenue.
The present value of the expected revenue from present period to time t,
t EAR , is given by:
t t ER ER ER EAR + + + = ... 1 0                                                                             (3)
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where  t a refers to the ratio of time t insurance premium payment to  t B .  The
insurers would charge premium so that:
t t EAR EAL =                                                                                                   (5)
The Residential Mortgage Risk Model
In the mortgage insurance premium framework, conditional probabilities of
default and prepayment have to be specified exogenously.  In this section, we
present a model for the estimation of these mortgage risks.
Mortgage insurers would like the loans they insure to continue until their
maturity.  However, at any point in time, borrowers have four options: (i) to
continue paying their loans, (ii) to prepay their obligation before the maturity
term, (iii) to default, and (iv) to delay payment.  The option to prepay or
default is available to borrowers.  It is widely accepted that mortgages can be
viewed as ordinary debt instruments with various options attached to them.Home Mortgage Risk: A Case for Insurance in India 63
Default is a put option: the borrower sells the house back to the lender in
exchange for eliminating the mortgage obligation.  Prepayment is a call
option: the borrower exchanges the unpaid balance on the debt instrument for
a release of further obligation.  By insuring the loan, the insurer bears the risk
of terminating the loan due to prepayment and default.  Prepayment stops the
future stream of insurance premiums. Default stops future premiums and, in
addition, the insurers have to pay the insured amount to the housing finance
company. Probabilities of prepayment and default of mortgage loan enter into
the insurance premium calculations of the insurer, as discussed earlier.  We
therefore need to estimate prepayment and default probabilities at each point
in time.
Empirical estimation of mortgage termination has utilized logit or probit
models to estimate the probability of termination or, more recently, utilized
hazard models to estimate the age of mortgages.  Analyses of the probability
of termination have utilized either data from mortgage pools (Cooperstein,
Redburn, and Meyers, 1991; Foster and Van Order, 1985) or data from
individual loans (Vandell and Thibodeau, 1985; Zorn and Lea, 1986; and
Capone and Cunningham, 1992).  Similarly, analyses of loan age have also
used either data from mortgage pools (Follain, Scott, and Yang 1992; and
Schwartz and Torous, 1993) or data from individual loans.
Earlier researchers (see for example Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross, 1985) have
used the option-pricing model proposed by Black and Scholes (1972) to
estimate prepayment and default probabilities.  Whenever the option is in
money, the borrower terminates its obligation.  Several explanations,
however, can be offered to explain why the contingent claim option pricing
models do not apply exactly to individual households’ housing mortgages.
First, owner-occupants may not be as financially sophisticated as the pure
option pricing models (OPM) imply.  Alternatively stated, these households
may face substantially high transaction costs in their refinancing decisions
because they require much time and effort to make correct decisions, given
their lack of financial sophistication.  Second, prepayments or defaults by
homeowners are influenced by many other decisions that make it difficult to
identify clearly the effects of OPM.  For example, households often prepay
because their job locations change, or there is a change in the composition of
household, like divorce.  Third, prepayment or default may occur as a part of
the overall desire of households to readjust the composition of their
portfolios.  For example, a person may choose to refinance in order to
increase his or her loan-to-value ratio and use the proceeds to make other
investments.  Fourth, the data available to estimate prepayment or default
studies may constitute part of the problem.  In particular, the interest rate
pattern of the past fifteen years may not contain enough volatility to measure64 Tiwari
with this precision their effects on prepayments.  Similarly, housing prices
may not have enough volatility to measure their effects on defaults.
Several recent empirical studies have applied the Cox Proportional Hazard
Model (Cox and Oakes, 1984) to estimate mortgage risk (e.g. Green and
Shoven, 1986; Schwartz and Torous, 1989; Quigley and Van Order, 1990,
1995; Follain, Ondrich, and Sinha, 1996; Boyer, Follain, Ondrich, and
Piccirillo, 1997).  Instead of solving for the unique critical vales of the state
variables in the contingent claim model, the proportional hazard model
assumes that at each point of time during the mortgage contract period, the
mortgage has a certain probability of termination, conditional on survival of
the mortgage.  The hazard function in this model is defined as the product of
a baseline hazard and a set of time-varying covariates.  These covariates need
not be limited to the option value itself.  They may include other important
determinants of behaviour.  The proportional hazard model can thus
incorporate reasonable mortgage termination behaviour due to prepayment or
default that would be considered sub-optimal under the contingent claim
framework.
Results for the US market indicates that the hazard rate of prepayment is
proportional to “lock-in,” which is the difference between the face value and
the market value of the mortgage as a proportion of the value of the property
(Green and Shoven 1986).  Other variables that affect the hazard rate besides
the cash value of a mortgage are household income and characteristics of the
household head (Quigley 1987).
The proportional hazard model is used in the loan termination literature to
analyze mortgage termination behaviour.
In technical terms, on the basis of proportional hazard methodology, the
probability of mortgage termination due to prepayment or default (a), given
the exogenous factors Z1,…,Zn at time t, can be divided into two
multiplicative factors:
Prob = h(a) * Π  (Z1,…,Zn),                                                                           (6)
where h(a) is the baseline hazard, which is the proportion of the population
that would prepay or default under completely stationary or homogeneous
conditions.  The baseline hazard gives the normal time profile of the
conditional prepayment or default rates (the probability of prepayment or
default in year 1, year 2, etc., of a loan in a particular loan group).  In
addition, Π (Z1,…,Zn), are the exogenous factors that make prepayments or
default more or less likely.  The effect of these factors on prepayment or
default is also assumed to be time separable.  That is, past and futureHome Mortgage Risk: A Case for Insurance in India 65
attributes of the environment are assumed to have no effect on turnover in the
present (Green and Shoven 1986; Quigley 1987; Van Order 1990)
The Cox Proportional Hazard model (Cox and Oates, 1984) is defined as:
H(ti, Z) = h0(ti) exp [Z(ti) β ]                                                                         (7)
where i is the month in observation, Z(ti) is a set of time-varying covariates,
and h0 (.) is the baseline hazard reflecting the age-related amortization feature
of mortgage.  β s are the coefficients of covariates in Equation (7).  The most
popular estimation approach for proportional hazard model is the Cox partial
likelihood approach (CPL, see Cox and Oates, 1984).
The function specifying mortgage risk estimates the probability that a
mortgage loan will be prepaid or be defaulted during any period, conditional
on survival to that period.  The model assumes that borrowers prepay or
default to maximize their wealth.  Following the contingent claim model, the
empirical model specifies the probability of exercising these options as a
function to the extent to which options are `in the money,’ and the `trigger
events’ that effect the decision on how far the options need to be in the
money for it to be optimal to exercise.  The ratio of the present discounted
value of the unpaid balance to the par value of the mortgage measures the
extent to which the call option is in the money.  The put option is defined as
the probability that the difference between the current value of the house and
present value of the outstanding balance would be negative.
A typical way to value the call option in empirical real estate finance research
is to compute the ratio of the present discounted value of the unpaid
mortgage balance at the contract interest rate relative to the value discounted
at the current market mortgage rate, assuming a deterministic structure
(Deng, Quigley, and Van Order 1998).
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where  τ i  is loan age measured in months, ω l is a vector of indices for
geographical location, Kl is the loan origination time, MOPIPMTl is the
monthly principal and interest payment, NOTERATEl is the mortgage
contract rate, MKTRATE ω l,Kl+τ i is the current local mortgage rate, and
TERMl is the mortgage loan term.
Similarly, to estimate the put option, we need to measure the market value of
each house quarterly and to compute homeowner equity quarterly.  We use
the house price index for Mumbai from Tiwari and Hasegawa (2000).  We
estimate the variance of price for each house at the time of default.  The price
index and estimated variance permits us to estimate the distribution of
homeowner equity monthly for each observation.  The equity for loan l
( l EQY ) is given by:
l l l pdvunpblc mktvalue EQY − =                                                                       (10)
where,  l mktvalue is the present market value of the house and  l pdvunpblc is the
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i l k Pindex τ,  is the price index at the time of claim or censorship of loan.
l k Pindex  is the price index at the time of loan origination.
The present discounted value of an unpaid mortgage is the same as in the
calculation of the call option.
The probability of negative equity (put option) is given by:
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where cdf(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, and
i l k e τ,
2  is the variance of price. pneq is the probability that equity is negative.
That is, the probability that the put option is in money.
To estimate the model with CPL, we first calculate the call or put option
covariates for each individual loan and construct the covariate matrix, which
consists of the call option covariate (POPTION), put option covariate
(PNEQ), the initial loan to value ratio, the monthly installment-to-income
ratio agreed to at the time of loan origination, and other household-related
variables explained in next section.  Another factor that we consider is that
the mortgage termination behaviour for home purchase loans and other loans
related to housing (like home improvement etc.) is different.  The incidences
of prepayment and default of other loans are much higher.  We include a
dummy variable for other loans in our model to account for this difference.
Estimates of Mortgage Risks
Data
There are two databases that we have used for our analysis.  The database for
the prepayment analysis is the administrative database of a housing finance
company for Mumbai, which contains 12,173 observations on single-family
mortgage loans issued between January 1989 and March 1998.  All are fixed-
rate, level payment, and fully amortized.  The term of loan in most cases is 15
years, but other terms (5 and 10 years) also exist.  The mortgage history
period ends in March 1998.  The database for the default analysis contains
3,497 loan observations for Mumbai.  We define a loan delinquent for three
consecutive months as defaulted
4.  The term of loan in most of the cases is 15
years and the loans were issued during January 1990 to March 1996.  These
two databases are completely different but contain all segments of
households and properties in all locations of Mumbai.  The typical way of
buying properties in Mumbai is through real estate agents or developers.
Most of the houses are of the apartment type.  The share of independent
houses in total houses in Mumbai is negligible.
 Developers require construction finance for their projects, and they borrow
from housing finance companies.  Housing finance companies lend to
developers based on their credit worthiness and project viability.  Past
experience with developers plays an important role.  In the process, housing
finance companies rate the developers and their projects.  These ratings are
                                                
4 This is the typical way in which housing finance companies define defaults in India
on their balance sheets.68 Tiwari
an important feature of developers’ marketing of their projects.  Housing
finance companies also simplify the process for approving loans to borrowers
who buy properties in approved projects.  The criterion to evaluate
borrowers’ credit worthiness is based on their repayment abilities.  Salaried
borrowers have easy access to housing finance compared to self-employed or
other types of borrowers.  Income plays an important role in determining the
maximum amount of a loan.  The borrowers and the properties, which they
have bought, are distributed all over Mumbai.
 The data used in this paper is an administrative database, which accounts for
the flow of loan repayment for each of the loans during their term.  Whenever
the loan is prepaid or defaulted, the amount and date are also entered into the
database.  In both databases, for each mortgage loan, the available
information includes the year and month of origination and termination (if it
has been closed), indicators of prepayment or default, the purchase price of
the property, the original loan amount, the initial loan-to-value ratio, the
mortgage contract interest rate, the purpose of the loan (whether it is for
home ownership or home improvement), the monthly interest, and principal
payment.
  Though we have referred to these databases as prepayment or default
databases mainly due to the purpose for which they have been used, the
prepayment databases include loan information for those which are either
prepaid or still active.  Similarly, the defaults database includes loans, which
are either delinquent or still active.  These active loans may close normally at
the end of their terms or become prepaid or defaulted in the future.  The
databases also reflect information about the borrowers, like the number of co-
borrowers, if any, the monthly income of borrowers at the time of origination,
the sex of the borrower, his or her employment status (self employed,
unemployed, or in the service), education level, marital status (single,
divorced, married), and the age of the borrower.
Databases used for prepayment analysis have information about whether a
loan was in arrears before being prepaid.  This information we have captured
in our analysis on prepayment.  Housing finance companies in India lend for
purchase of houses and also for the extension, redevelopment, etc., of
existing houses.  We have referred to the loans for home extension, etc., as
other loans (OTHLOAN), although they are part of the same database to help
us in identifying the role that different financial products play in the
prepayment or default motives of households.  Table 1 describes the
variables from the database used in this analysis.Home Mortgage Risk: A Case for Insurance in India 69
Table 1:  Single-family Mortgage Data Description
Variable name Definition Description
COBORR Number of co-
borrowers
HFC allows more than one person jointly borrowing,
subject to some conditions, for the same house because it
enhances their income based eligibility to borrow for higher




Monthly principal and interest payment to income ratio.
This payment is decided at the time of origination of loan.
LCR Loan-to-cost ratio Loan value to cost of property at the time of origination
AGE Age of the first
borrower
Age at the time of origination of loan
POPTION Call option price As discussed above
PNEQ Put option price As discussed above
SINGLE Borrower’s marital
status is single
Dummy equal to 1, if borrower is unmarried, divorced,
widower, or widow at the time of borrowing; otherwise 0.





Dummy equal to 1, if the first borrower’s qualification is less
than or equal to class 12; otherwise 0.
SEMPL Borrower is self-
employed
Dummy equal to 1, if the borrower is self-employed;
otherwise 0.
SEX Male Dummy equal to 1, if the borrower is male, and 0
otherwise.
NRI Non-resident Indian Dummy equal to 1, if the borrower is a non-resident Indian,
and 0 otherwise.
OTHLOAN Loan for home
improvement,
extension etc.
Dummy equal to 1 if the loan is for home improvement,
extension, etc., and 0 if the loan is for home purchase.
SERVPLACE Place where loans
are serviced
Dummy equal to 1, if the servicing of loan is at the office of
the housing finance company, and 0 if the servicing is at
the collection centers.
DELIN Loan in arrears
before prepayment
Dummy equal to 1, if loans were in arrears before
prepayment, and 0 otherwise.
The mean values of these variables are summarized in Table 2.  There are
some differences in the mean values of variables for the two databases.  Most
striking is the loan-to-cost (LCR) ratio.  The average LCR in the prepayment
database is 55.56%, and in the default database 68.39%.  In India, the second
mortgage is not common.  The rest of the finance is raised through
households’ own equity.
As indicated by the database, the own equity is very high and ranges from 31
to 45%.  Another difference is in educational levels.  The number of low
educationally qualified households in the first database (used for prepayment70 Tiwari
analysis) is 40%, while in the second database (used for default study) it is
52%.  The typical installment to income ratio is around 34%.  The average
age of borrowers is around 41, and the average number of borrowers per loan
is 1.40.  The proportion of self-employed is higher (7.3%) in the prepayment
database than in the default database (5.6%).





Data Period January 1989 - March 1998 January 1990-March 1996
COBORR (Numbers) 0.3988 0.37
IIR (%) 33.6432 34.9666
LCR (%) 55.5668 68.39
TERM (Years) 13.2 13.0
AGE (Years) 40.9245 41.627
POPTION 0.0010 -0.0018
PNEQ 0.0039
SINGLE (Proportion) 0.1763 0.1553
LQUALIF (Proportion) 0.4004 0.5258
SEMPL (Proportion) 0.0726 0.0557
NRI (Proportion) 0.03 0.0098
OTHLOAN 0.1124 0.0545
SEX (Male) 0.92 0.9527
DELIN (Proportion) 0.1895
The market rate used in this analysis is the quarterly average interest rate
charged by housing finance companies on new mortgages.  This was taken by
collecting historical announcements and creating a time series of the housing
finance company’s mortgage rate changes.
To calculate the option price for prepayments (POPTION), we used the
market rate as the applicable rate of interest on new mortgages at the time
when prepayment occurs.  To calculate the option price for defaults (PNEQ),
we used the time series market price from Tiwari, et al. (2000).  The value of
POPTION in the prepayment database is 0.0010.  This means that the value
of the mortgage in money is POTION times the present value of the mortgage
at market interest rates.  The value of POTION in default database is –
0.0018, indicating that there is no incentive to prepay the loan.  The value of
the mortgage in money for the default database (PNEQ) is 0.0039, indicating
that the value of the mortgage in money is 0.0039 times the initial value of
the property.  Loans are observed in each month from the month ofHome Mortgage Risk: A Case for Insurance in India 71
origination through the month of termination, maturation, or through March
1998 for active loans.
Estimation Results
Figure 2a and 2b displays the conditional prepayment rate as a function of
duration for home loans and other loans, respectively. Figure 3 shows the
conditional default rate as a function of duration.










































































Figure 3:  Conditional Default Rate
Term in months 































Table 3 presents estimates from a Cox-proportional hazard model estimated
by the non-parametric technique for the prepayment and default models
separately.  The results show that financial motivation is important in
governing the prepayment or default behaviour.  For example, when the call
option or put option is in money, the mortgage termination hazard increases.
High equity (low loan to value ratio) reduces the prepayment hazard, While
low equity increases the possibility of defaults.  Borrowers with loan-to-cost
ratios higher than 80 are more likely to default on their loans.  The loan-to-
value ratio is known when the mortgages are initiated and may well reveal
borrowers’ risk preferences.
The model includes a variable measuring the monthly payment to income
ratio.  The coefficient of this variable is positive for both the prepayment and
default models.  The positive coefficient in the prepayment model indicates
that if the value of this variable is higher, then the monthly income outflow
becomes significant and any financial wealth gain is utilized to reduce this
outflow.  The higher the installment to income ratio, the higher the
probability of prepayment hazard.  However, the positive sign in the default
model indicates that higher monthly outflows of households may cause
defaults because households find it difficult to repay higher amounts.Home Mortgage Risk: A Case for Insurance in India 73
Table 3:  Cox Proportional Hazard Model of Prepayment and Default
Variable Prepayment Estimate Default Estimate
COBORR 0.056 (3.01)*
IIR 0.0034 (10.9) .0068(3.6)
LCR -0.007 (69.7)













Notes:  (1) Figures in brackets indicate wald statistics
            (2) * significant at 8% and ** significant at 12%. All other variables are significant at
the 5% level.
Household-specific variables besides financial variables also play an
important role in determining prepayments.  Housing finance companies
allow the incomes of spouses, parents, or siblings to be pooled together to
determine the loan amount for a house.  If there are joint borrowers for the
same house, the prepayment hazard increases.  This is because the change in
income of any of the borrowers could result in incidences of prepayment.
This variable was insignificant in the default model.  The age of a borrower
plays an important role.  If the borrower is in the late stage of his or her life at
the time of the loan, s/he is less likely to prepay.
The default model shows positive signs for age the variable, which means
that default probability increases with age.  Single (unmarried or divorced)
borrowers are also less likely to prepay, as indicated by the negative
coefficient for this dummy.  This variable dropped out as insignificant in the
default model.  The coefficient for the SEMPL dummy is negative, indicating
that self-employed persons have less probability of prepaying their loans.74 Tiwari
The SEMPL dummy has a positive sign for the default model, indicating that
the probability of default by self-employed borrowers is higher.
Borrowers who are less educationally-qualified (LQUALIF, 1-if borrower
has studied only up to class 12, 0-otherwise) are less likely to prepay but
more likely to default.  Highly-qualified borrowers are less likely to default.
In the default model, the omitted borrowers are those who have attended
university but have not acquired professional qualifications.  A non-resident
Indian borrower is more likely to default.  This is primarily because her (his)
intention of investing in residential properties in India is governed more by
the returns on the investment.  Another likely reason can be that s/he finds it
difficult to pay because s/he lives abroad.  Male borrowers are less likely to
default.
If a loan was in arrears, households can exercise their call option and
terminate the loan.  The variable, which captures this behaviour (DELIN),
has a positive coefficient and is very highly significant.  This variable
captures some of the information, which cannot be captured otherwise.  For
example, if the borrower has infrequent income or difficulty in paying every
month because of inaccessibility to payment location or lender’s recovery
mechanism or arrears, the lender can induce the borrower to prepay and
terminate his liability.
Figure 4a and 4b shows the predicted cumulative prepayment rates for home
loans and other loans at the mean value of variables.  We plot the cumulative
prepayment rates for three values of LTV. The cumulative hazard function
due to default is shown in Figure 5a and 5b.  These Figures show that the
prepayment hazard is more critical for other loans than for home loans.
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Mortgage Insurance Simulation: An Example
After knowing the prepayment and default probabilities, the structure of an
insurance premium can be calculated.  Mortgage insurance in India does not76 Tiwari
exist.  This paper computes the premium structure for a hypothetical case.
The default and prepayment probabilities are estimated for the following
borrower category.
−   Age: 40 years
−   Sex: male
−   Qualification: High
−   Employment: Employed
−   Monthly income: Rs.47500
−   Cost of property: Rs.1428571
−   Initial loan amount: Rs.1000000 (with LCR of 70)
−   Loan amount with insurance: Rs.1357143 (with LCR of 95)
−   Term of loan: 15 years
−   Applicable interest rate: 15%
−   Loan to cost ratio: Initial – 70, but after buying insurance – 95
−   Installment to income ratio – 30 but with changed loan to value ratio - 41
We assumed the discount rate as 15% for the calculation of loss and revenue
for the mortgage insurance equation.  We assumed an insurance structure that
requires a uniform premium rate depending on outstanding unpaid balances.
A calculation for the above borrower category indicates that a premium of
0.05% of the outstanding balance would be able to cover the cost of
insurance.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the possibility of mortgage
insurance in India.  The Indian housing market is constrained by the
availability of finance.  The risk associated with the residential loan is borne
by the lender.  This makes the criteria of lending very stringent.  The average
loan-to-cost ratio in India is around 0.55, and the installment-to-income ratio
is 0.34.  These constraints require a large initial equity from the home buyer.
In developed markets like the US, borrowers buy mortgage insurance, which
enables them to borrow higher amounts.  Mortgage insurers insure the loans
against defaults for an insurance premium.  We presented a framework to
estimate the premium structure.  To formulate the premium structure, a
knowledge of the probability of prepayment and default was necessary.  The
second objective of this paper was to estimate the probability of mortgage
termination due to either default or prepayment.Home Mortgage Risk: A Case for Insurance in India 77
This paper has presented a model of mortgage termination through
prepayments or defaults for home mortgages in India using the Cox
proportional hazard technique.  This is the first analysis of housing mortgage
termination in India.
As a first step, we estimated the baseline hazard for mortgage termination.
This baseline hazard was then modeled as a function of the price of call
options and other financial and household variables.
The results of the analysis indicate that the financial value of a call option or
put option plays an important role in the exercise of a prepayment or default
option.  The results indicated that introducing volatility and uncertainty to
future interest rates has an effect on mortgage prepayment behaviour.  The
uncertainty and volatility of housing prices leads to default.
In addition, the results indicated that liquidity constraints also play an
important role in the exercise of options in the mortgage market.  Those are
more likely to have low-levels of equity, and are less likely to exercise
prepayment options when it is in their financial interest to not do so.  These
results are explicable, not by option theory, but rather by liquidity constraints
that arise from qualification rules typically enforced by lenders.
Ceteris paribus, those who have chosen high initial LTV ratios are more
likely to exercise prepayment options in the mortgage market.  This factor,
known at the time mortgages are issued, also reflect investor preferences for
risk and investor sophistication in the market for mortgages on owner-
occupied housing.  A low level of equity has an impact on defaults.  Though
the results did not find a very strong relation between the loan-to-cost ratio
with defaults.
Finally, borrowers’ household variables play an important role in determining
prepayment or default rates.  All other variables remaining constant, a self-
employed person is less likely to prepay, but more likely to default.  The
same goes for a single person, a less educated borrower, or a person in the
later stages of life at the time of the loan.  However, joint borrowers have a
greater likelihood of prepaying their loans. We used the conditional
probabilities of default and prepayment in the insurance model, and a
hypothetical simulation for the insurance premium structure has been carried
out.  The overall results of the model are quite promising, and present a case
for developing a mortgage insurance market in India.78 Tiwari
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